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Abstract In this paper, a classic and seminal contribution of Williamson (J Polit
Econ 75:123–138, 1967), ‘‘Hierarchical control and optimum firm size’’, is revisited
so as to remove two of its restrictive assumptions. The introduction of the dynamics
of the quality of vertical communication into Williamson’s static model and the
development of a simulation to analyze these dynamics provide the opportunity to
demonstrate the plausibility of a new conjecture: in each and every hierarchically
structured organization, irreversible organizational uncontrollability is ultimately
bound to arise, even in a completely stable environment. This is our main contri-
bution. Moreover, we demonstrate that this conjecture is also valid for non-hier-
archically structured organizations.
Keywords Control loss  Uncontrollability  Serial reproduction  Organizational
failure  Simulation  Stochastic logistic equation
1 Introduction
In a classic and seminal article, Williamson (1967) demonstrated the plausibility
that ‘‘the cumulative effects of control loss are fundamentally responsible for
limitations in firm size’’ (1967, p. 130). By way of introduction, Williamson used a
seemingly incidental but very insightful remark made by Boulding at a lecture for
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the Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (Boulding 1966, p. 8):
‘‘There is a great deal of evidence that almost all organizational structures tend to
produce false images in the decision-maker, and that the larger and more
authoritarian the organization, the better the chance that its top decision-makers
will be operating in purely imaginary worlds. This perhaps is the most fundamental
reason for supposing that there are ultimately diminishing returns to scale.’’ Using a
model prepared for this purpose, Williamson demonstrated the plausibility of
Boulding’s statement. In so doing, he introduced the key concept of control, defined
as ‘‘the fraction a of the intentions of a superior effectively satisfied by a subordinate
(0\ a\ 1)’’ (Williamson 1967, p. 127).1
In the current article, we reinterpret and enrich Williamson’s (1967) analysis by
removing two of its restrictive assumptions. The introduction of the dynamics of the
quality of vertical communication into Williamson’s static model and the
development of a simulation to analyze these dynamics provide the opportunity
to demonstrate the plausibility of a second conjecture: in each and every
hierarchically organized firm, irreversible organizational uncontrollability is
ultimately bound to arise.2 Moreover, we demonstrate that this conjecture is also
valid for non-hierarchically structured organizations. On the basis of our findings,
we argue that the theory of the firm can and should be enriched by developing an
information exchange imperfection perspective on organizational functioning.
Specifically, in order to eliminate the first restriction—the model being static
instead of dynamic—we introduce a time dimension in a new mathematical model
that focuses on the dynamics of the quality of vertical communication. We carry out
a computer simulation with this model (a stochastic logistic equation). The result
transcends Williamson’s analysis in offering a rationale not only for his own
conjecture, but also for the conjecture that in each and every hierarchically
organized firm irreversible organizational uncontrollability is ultimately bound to
arise, even in a completely stable environment. We define uncontrollability as the
situation in which control has fallen below a certain level such that the superior
cannot take any effective remedial action because, for lack of relevant information,
diagnosis is not possible.
A second restriction implied by Williamson is that he models hierarchically
structured organizations. We will demonstrate that adapting our analysis to
organizations that are non-hierarchical—that is, in which participants are given
more leeway by the superior in deciding appropriate courses of action—requires
only limited reformulation of our model. The results of our analysis are identical:
organizational uncontrollability is still ultimately bound to arise, for both
hierarchies and non-hierarchies. But before doing all this, we will first carefully
1 Confusingly, Tannenbaum (1962, p. 237) and later authors such as Leifer and Mills (1996) used the
word ‘‘control’’ for the process, and not for the end result. In their vocabulary, we probably would have
been using a term such as ‘‘control effectiveness percentage’’ where we join Williamson in using the term
‘‘control’’. Interestingly, where these authors describe ‘‘control loss’’ and ‘‘loss of control’’ meanings
roughly coincide.
2 We by no means suggest that uncontrollability is the only cause of organizational failure. The reader is
referred to, for example, Stinchcombe (1965), Hannan and Freeman (1977, 1984), Miller (1990), Levitt
and March (1988) and Sorge and van Witteloostuijn (2004) for complementary arguments.
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introduce Williamson’s (1967) argument. We will do so by extensively quoting his
original analysis. After all, we would not be able to introduce his logic more clearly
and lucidly than he could himself—far from that.
2 The concept of control
It is entirely appropriate to start with a quotation by Coase, who laid the proverbial
foundation stone for the transaction cost ‘‘school’’ in his Coase (1937) masterpiece
‘‘The Nature of the Firm’’. In this school’s approach to organizations, the idea is
emphasized that the essence of an organization lies in the fact that its participants no
longer enjoy complete freedom of action. The transaction cost school studies the
merits and demerits of transferring authority into the hands of a boss, who makes
decisions after uncertainties regarding the environment have been resolved. Or, in
the words of Coase (1937, p. 39):
At this stage it is important to note the character of the contract into which a
factor enters that is employed in a firm. The contract is one whereby the factor,
for a certain remuneration (which may be fixed or fluctuating), agrees to obey
the directions of an entrepreneur within certain limits (italics in the original;
underlining added).
Simon formalized this thought as follows:
The authority relationship that exists between an employer and an employee, a
relationship created by the employment contract, will play a central role in our
theory. What is the nature of the relationship? We will call our employer
B (for ‘‘boss’’), and our employee W (for ‘‘worker’’). The collection of specific
actions W performs on the job (typing and filing certain letters, laying bricks,
or what not) we will call his behavior. We will consider the set of all possible
behavior patterns of W and we will let x designate an element of this set. A
particular x might then represent a given set of tasks, performed at a particular
rate of working, a particular level of accuracy, and so forth. We will say that
B exercises authority over W if W permits B to select x. That is, W accepts
authority when his behavior is determined3 by B’s decision. In general, W will
accept authority only if x0, the x chosen by B, is restricted to some given subset
(W’s ‘‘area of acceptance’’) of all the possible values. This is the definition of
authority that is most generally accepted in modern administrative theory
(1951, pp. 293–294; emphases in original).
The definition of an organization as ‘‘a number of people connected by authority
relationships’’, or—in a more formal vocabulary—‘‘a nexus of agency relations that
can be represented by an authority chart’’ would fit perfectly in Simon’s and
Williamson’s analysis. They analyzed hierarchical organizations with well-defined
authority lines, or—in a more military language—chains of command. Many others,
3 Later analysis, starting of course with Williamson’s article, showed the phrase ‘‘when his behavior is
determined by B’s decision’’ to be too absolute.
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however, took a different track, studying the conformity of workers’ actions with
management instructions—or, in a less hierarchical context, conformity to ‘‘the
rational of the organization’’ (Tannenbaum 1962, p. 237). They describe organi-
zations as, for instance, ‘‘bargaining and influence systems’’ (Abell 1975, 1977).
Still others focus on information processing and its dependence on motivational
situations, cognitive abilities and quantitative limitations (Leifer and Mills 1996;
Keren and Levhari 1989).
The track Williamson chose was to emphasize information transmission. This
emphasis by no means contradicts these other arguments, but should be regarded as
complementary. His analysis can be summarized as follows. Management of the
firm is required to make the appropriate decisions in adapting to new circumstances,
externally or internally: requesting the relevant data from the shop floor, processing
the information supplied, and providing the appropriate instructions that are
transferred directly or indirectly to the workers at the shop floor. Because the
number of workers is too large to be managed by one manager, one or more
hierarchical layers are interposed between the top manager and the shop floor. The
number of intermediate layers will depend on the number of workers on the shop
floor, and the number of workers that can be handled by one (intermediate) manager
(i.e., her/his span of control).
Hierarchical organization involves vertical transmission of information: down-
wards, in the sense that instructions are passed from management to the shop floor
and that information is demanded from the shop floor; and upwards, as data are
either delivered from the shop floor to management on demand or spontaneously
passed from the shop floor to management. The main question now becomes what
the consequences are of the addition of hierarchical layers on the level of control. In
his seminal article, rightly titled ‘‘Hierarchical control and optimum firm size’’,
Williamson described the mechanism by which (lack of) control is influenced by the
number of hierarchical layers lucidly:
The aspect of bureaucratic theory that we regard as particularly relevant for
studying the question of a static limitation to firm size is what we will refer to
as the ‘‘control loss’’ phenomenon. It is illustrated daily in the rumor-
transmission process and has been studied intensively by Bartlett (1920, 1932)
in his experimental studies of serial reproduction. His experiments involved
the oral transmission of descriptive and argumentative passages through a
chain of serially linked individuals. Bartlett concludes from a number of such
studies that: ‘It is now perfectly clear that serial reproduction normally brings
about startling and radical alterations in the material dealt with. Epithets are
changed into their opposites; incidents and events are transposed; names and
numbers rarely survive intact for more than a few reproductions; opinions and
conclusions are reversed—nearly every possible variation seems as if it can
take place, even in a relatively short series. At the same time the subjects may
be very well satisfied with their efforts, believing themselves to have passed
on all important features with little or no change, and merely, perhaps, to have
omitted unessential matters.’ Bartlett illustrates this graphically with a line
drawing of an owl which—when redrawn successively by eighteen
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individuals, each sketch based on its immediate predecessor—ended up as a
recognizable cat; and the further from the initial drawing one moved, the
greater the distortion experienced. The reliance of hierarchical organizations
on serial reproduction for their functioning thus exposes them to what may
become serious distortions in transmission (1967, p. 126).4
This characteristic of serial reproduction was confirmed recently by Roediger
et al. (2014, p. 2): ‘‘In sum, virtually every experiment we can find using Bartlett’s
serial reproduction technique [including Roediger´s experiments: HvdM and AvW]
confirms his observations that social transmission of information is error prone and
that the more links there are in the chain, the greater the probability of error’’
(comment added). Serial reproduction involves four iterative steps: (1) formulation;
(2) transmittal; (3) reception; and (4) remembering (and then back to formulation).
In each step, alteration (garbling) can and usually will occur. These alterations can
consist of omission, addition and/or content change. For example, the information
provided by a subordinate to a superior might be ambiguously formulated, leaving
room for different interpretations at the superior’s side, feeding a misinterpretation
into the superior’s memory. This information can involve anything work-related,
from competitive business intelligence and cost accounting information to stock
inventory data to product quality metrics. Comparable alteration can occur when an
instruction reaches a subordinate. The key is that whatever the nature of the
information or instruction, part of the message will be garbled—however Epsilon
small—in the exchange. In fact, as Stinchcombe (2001, p. 1) argues, even formal
texts (formulated in such a way that garbling is minimized) are still subject to
misinterpretation and misrepresentation. ‘‘I will try to remind the reader from time
to time that I do not believe that formality always works.’’
Williamson continues by arguing that
Downs has since elaborated the argument and summarized it in his ‘‘Law of
Diminishing Control: ‘the larger any organization becomes, the weaker is the
control over its actions exercised by those at the top’ (1966, p. 109). The
cumulative loss of control as instructions and information are transmitted
across successive hierarchical levels is responsible for this result. Thus,
assuming that economies of specialization have been exhausted and that
superiors are normally more competent than subordinates, a quality-quantity
4 Interestingly, Marris and Mueller (1980, p. 39) reject this argument. In developing an extremely elegant
model, they define XL as representing a message received at level L purporting to be a message from
L ? 1. If the message is not correctly received or is misinterpreted, there is an error (XL – XL?1). They
assume the possible correlation between the error and the message most generally to be expressed by the
regression equation:
ðXL  XLþ1Þ ¼ ðb 1ÞXLþ1 þ lL:
Marris and Mueller then state that ‘‘with effective monitoring b could be less than one.’’ This implies that
a copy can more faithfully reflect the original than the original itself. No amount of monitoring can ever
achieve that. Unfortunately, the remainder of their model, elegant as it is, rests on this misconception.
Their result (that, according to their model, organizations can grow infinitely without losing efficiency)
must therefore be rejected.
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trade-off necessarily exists in every decision to expand. It arises for two
reasons, both of which are related to the distance of the top executive from the
locus of productive activity. First, expansion of the organization (adding an
additional hierarchical level) removes the superior further from the basic data
that affect operating conditions; information regarding these conditions must
now be transmitted across an additional hierarchical level which exposes the
data to an additional serial reproduction operation with its attendant losses.
Furthermore, the top executive cannot have all the information that he had
before the expansion plus the information now generated by the new parts
(assuming that he was fully employed initially). Thus, he can acquire
additional information only by sacrificing some of the detail provided to him
previously. Put differently, he trades off breadth for depth in undertaking the
expansion; he has more resources under his control, but the quality (serial
reproduction loss) and the quantity (phenomenon capacity constraint) of his
information are both less with respect to the deployment of each resource unit.
In a similar way, being further removed from the operating situation and
having more subordinates means his instructions to each are less detailed and
are passed across an additional hierarchical level. For precisely the same
reasons, therefore, the behavior of the operating units will scarcely correspond
as closely to his objectives as it did prior to the expansion. Taken together, this
loss in the quality of data provided to the peak coordinator and in the quality
of the instructions supplied to the operating units made necessary by the
expansion will be referred to as ‘‘control loss’’. It will exist even if the
objectives are perfectly consonant with those of their superiors, and a fortiori,
when subordinate objectives are dissonant (1967, pp. 126–127; emphasis in
original).
In elaborating upon his basic model, Williamson assumed that control loss is
strictly cumulative across hierarchical layers, and that there is no systematic
compensation.5 This assumption is reasonable. If, for instance, 90 % of the
instructions from the super-boss reaches the boss reliably, and 10 % is garbled, the
assumption that these latter instructions by the super-boss will ever reach the worker
correctly would seem odd. Of the former, a certain percentage (say, 5 %) will
become garbled during transmission from the boss to the worker, and 95 % will be
transferred correctly. This would mean that 0.95 * 0.90 = 85.5 % of the original
instructions would arrive at the worker undamaged, implying a cumulative control
loss of 14.5 %. With each new hierarchical level, a new factor is inserted in the
garbling multiplication, making the information transmitted across hierarchical
layers more and more imperfect.
Of course, the number of hierarchical layers is not only determined by the
number of workers, but also by the span of control of each manager, being the
5 Again, he is contradicted by Marris and Mueller, who argue that cumulative errors increase linearly
with the length of the chain of command (Marris and Mueller 1980, p. 38). This is illogical. Assuming a
certain constant percentage of correct transmission at each stage, it is obvious that this percentage only
affects data correctly transmitted, and not data incorrectly transmitted.
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number of subordinates she manages.6 If each ‘‘boss’’ manages ten workers and
each ‘‘super-boss’’ manages ten bosses, then a hundred workers will be led by one
super-boss, through those ten bosses (with three hierarchical layers). If, however, a
manager does not handle more than five subordinates, four hierarchical levels are
needed. Because in the latter case each manager can spend more time with each
subordinate, control at each hierarchical level is likely to increase. However, more
hierarchical layers imply more cross-layer information garbling. This is the key
trade-off between span of control and hierarchical layering. Depending on the
values of the within-layer and the across-layer garbling factor, the net effect can go
either way: it can be negative or positive. If the within-layer garbling factor (caused
by enlarging the scope) is higher than the across-layer garbling factor (caused by
imperfect vertical communication), then increasing the number of hierarchical
layers will alleviate control loss, and vice versa.
Williamson continues by developing a formal model in which he demonstrates
that the plausibility of his central thesis that ‘‘the cumulative effects of control loss
are fundamentally responsible for limitations in firm size.’’ This proposition follows
straightforwardly from his conception of control loss due to information garbling
across hierarchical layers. Furthermore, he shows that optimal firm size is reduced
by a lower level of control, and increased by a higher level of control.7 The bottom
line is that his model of the organization as a large Chinese whisper game clearly
reveals that the intrinsic and inevitable imperfection of human communication
implies important scale diseconomies that went, perhaps surprisingly, largely
unnoticed in post-1967 organizational economics.
Before turning to a dynamic version of this logic, we first briefly summarize
Williamson’s (1967) formal model. We denote control between hierarchical levels y
and y ? 1 as ay, the number of employees as N, and the scope of each manager as s.
The number of hierarchical layers, n, then equals slog N ? 1. Cumulative control is





In order to simplify the model he was developing, Williamson assumed that
control loss was equal for each additional hierarchical level. In that case, when
slog N equals n - 1, naturally, A = an-1. The result is that control loss becomes a
power function of the number of levels, being equal to 1 - an-1.
6 The signal detection literature, and specifically Wickens (2002), could very well offer additional
insights into optimizing the number of subordinates. The current article concentrates on the other
dimension of the problem—i.e., vertical communication.
7 Calvo and Wellisz (1978) ‘‘show’’ that ‘‘limitations of firm size by loss of control across hierarchical
levels depend crucially on the nature of the supervision process.’’ If the employees cannot identify the
times at which their performance is monitored, there is no limit imposed on the firm size by the
extensiveness of the hierarchical structure.’’ Only through brave additional assumptions, following a
conventionalist strategem (Popper 1963, p. 48), can this statement be maintained. The theory is
mathematically refuted by Camacho and White (1981).
386 H. Mandele, A. Witteloostuijn
123
The basic model now contains the following variables:
1. s = Span of control (the number of employees a supervisor can handle
effectively);
2. a = Fraction of work done by a subordinate that contributes to objectives of her
supervisor (0\ a\ 1), or a compliance parameter;
3. Ni = Number of employees at the ith hierarchical level;
4. n = Number of hierarchical levels (the decision variable);
5. P = Price of output;
6. w0 = Wage of production workers; wi = wage of employees at ith hierarchical
level = w0b
n-i(b[ 1);
7. r = Non-wage variable cost per unit output; Q = output = h(as)n-1;
8. R = Total revenue = PQ; and C = total variable cost =
P
i=1
n wiNi ? rQ.
Williamson models net revenue to be




As long as a\ 1, the second derivative is negative (for details, see Williamson
1967, p. 129). Setting the first derivative equal to zero, we can conclude that there
exists a rational and positive number n* that would result in maximum net revenue.
When the number of hierarchical layers increases above that level, net revenue will
diminish. With this model, Williamson has demonstrated the plausibility of his
central thesis: cumulative effects of control loss are fundamentally responsible for
limitations to firm size. Additionally, he convincingly argues that optimal n*
increases as a increases (and, we would add, decreases as a decreases). In fact, if a
decreases sufficiently optimal n* becomes 1, and the raison d´eˆtre of the firm
disappears. Taking Williamson’s (1967) model as our steppingstone, we next
introduce a dynamic interpretation of the uncontrollability notion.
3 The dynamics of control
Stating that Williamson considered control to be fixed would be a misquotation. He
does indeed suggest that there is some variation, and he even develops a model in
which this compliance factor is expressed as a function of the average span of
control. However, Williamson’s model implicitly assumes that this factor is static—
that is, the extent of information garbling is not affected by time. We will now
discard this assumption in order to investigate the dynamics of control, instead of
the optimality of a certain firm size. In so doing, we give center stage to a dynamic
conception of control loss. Control loss, reflected in a decrease of Williamson’s
control factor a, can be caused by many circumstances and many types of behavior.
Most of these can either be avoided or repaired, or both. We are not concerned with
such avoidable or repairable causes of control loss. Rather, we develop a simulation
model that describes a particular cause of control loss that eventually—always and
inevitably, however long it may take—generates uncontrollability. Being
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theoretical, and a gross simplification, the model does not prove anything. Being
plausible, though, our model offers a rationale for our central conjecture: in the long
run, the uncontrollability of all organizations is both inevitable and irreparable. Our
model focuses on one link in the chain of command. As stated earlier, control loss is
strictly cumulative across hierarchical layers, and there is no systematic compen-
sation. Therefore, the description of the dynamics of control between two adjacent
hierarchical layers can be extended to loss of control between the head of the
organization and the shop floor.
In order to take appropriate decisions, a manager needs information. The more
detailed the instructions she8 has to pass on to her subordinates, the more
information she needs. She can limit the managerial information needed by
extending the scope of operational decisions—that is, by delegating authority. The
manager can diminish her dependence on particular agents or subordinates by, for
instance, creating lateral information channels (Galbraith 1977, p. 111), both from
the shop floor to the CEO and vice versa. It is one of the tasks of the manager to
monitor lateral flows and to take the actions necessary to maintain and repair them,
or to design the organization in such a way that these flows are optimal. This may be
a complex issue, involving mistakes and learning, but it can be done—at least, in
theory. However, our central premise is that whatever clever organizational designs,
information technologies and process measures are introduced, there will always be
information that has to be transmitted from the bottom of the organization to the top
and vice versa. It is here where the unavoidable source of control loss, however
minuscule, is located.
The Williamson model incorporates this argument through the essential a
parameter. Information transmission imperfection, however Epsilon tiny, (i) will
cause information demanded from the subordinate to be different from the real
needs of his superior, (ii) will imply that the superior obtains less than perfect
information from her subordinate, and (iii) will generate an imperfect perception of
reality by the superior. All this causes her orders to be less than perfect to reach the
intended goals and her requests for information less than perfectly covering her
managerial needs. Therefore, even if the subordinate succeeds in obeying the
instructions to the letter in minute detail (which in reality is never the case), control
loss cannot be avoided, and a\ 1. To further set aside other sources of control loss,
we take the case where our model describes a ‘‘mature’’ and ‘‘sincere’’ superior-
subordinate relationship; ‘‘mature’’ being defined as the state in which the routines
of an organization have already been developed and optimized, and ‘‘sincere’’ as the
absence of any agency issues. At time t = 0, when we start to trace the history of
the organization, the superior therefore knows what information she needs at that
time, and she recognizes that the agent will not cheat or shirk in any way. In a
mature and sincere organization, appropriate routines are established, and the flow
of information can be smaller.
We now need to translate the above model into a system that can be simulated.
To start with, the processes involved are described in Fig. 1.
8 To avoid crippled language, we assume that superiors are females and subordinates are males.
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The top layer represents the superior (B for Boss). The bottom line represents the
subordinate (W for Worker). Being a link in the chain, the B in this figure would be
the W in the link above and the W in the figure would be the B in the link below.
OA (Orders to Act) indicates the instructions for action given by B to W. RI is a
Request for Information. Information from Worker to Boss (IW2B) indicates
information transferred from the subordinate to the superior. I indicates the
information available to the superior and A represents the actions taken by the
subordinate (including the instructions she gives to her subordinates at the next
hierarchical level).
Formally, we can capture Fig. 1’s essence as follows. As above, we introduce a
number of simplifications, along the way, that make our simulation model
conservative by isolating the impact of control loss from other potentially failure-
enhancing influences. As we will explain below, we will do so by imposing a series
of simplifying assumptions that remove other sources of failure from our model set-
up. In so doing, we isolate the effect of information transmission imperfection from
other potential sources of scale diseconomies or control loss. To focus on the
essence, we have two people, the superior (B) and the subordinate (W).The superior
is extremely intelligent, as the quality of her instructions is bounded only by the
information available to her (another gross simplification). At time t, the superior
has information It available (It B 1). If It = 1, she can give instructions to W that
imply that if the subordinate follows them to the letter, the intentions of the superior
will be completely fulfilled. If It\ 1, the instructions that B can give are obviously
less perfect. At time t, B will give orders OAt to W. The appropriateness of these
orders is assumed to be proportionate to It (OAt  It).
However, there is always some ‘‘noise’’ in communication. We therefore include
a random garbling factor gt. So, for ease of interpretation, we now have
reformulated the control parameter a in the Simon–Williamson model as 1 - g:
the higher g, the more imperfect is the transmitted information. We assume that
B:
W:
It             It+2
              A t+1+R                                 At+3+R
RItOAt OAt+2 RIt+2IW2Bt+1
Fig. 1 Communication in a hierarchy. Top bar information available to the boss. Bottom
bar information available to worker. Arrows messages between boss and worker. OAt orders to act at
time t. RIt request for information at time t. IW2Bt information provided by worker to boss at time t
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(1 - gt) * OAt is understood by W. Without any orders, W will do his chores, R.
9
Because W is a most obedient employee, his additional actions, At?1 -R, closely
follow his understanding of the orders At?1 - R = (1 - gt) * OAt  (1 - gt) * It.
If no garbling takes place (g = 0), and if the availability of information is perfect
(It = 1), the actions will also be perfect (At?1 = 1). Then, control, as defined
earlier, is 100 %.
B knows that she will have to give orders again in t ? 2, and that she then will
need information to give adequate orders. She therefore requests information, the
adequacy of which is defined as RIt. A perfect request would be 100 %. However,
the information available to her is not perfect, and the adequacy of her request is
proportionate to that knowledge. Therefore, RIt  It. However, because B realizes
that things can happen at the level of W of which B is ignorant, she has arranged that
W will provide her with some extra information that W considers relevant. In
addition, B will demand the information she needs to provide standard data for
management information systems (cash in and outflows, out-of-pocket costs, store
data, et cetera). These data are also available for management purposes, especially
if they arrive in time to take appropriate action. Together, these data are included as
rr.
W is more than willing to provide whatever is requested, according to what he
understands B wants to know, but again we encounter the random garbling factor gt.
So here we have another simplifying assumption: the subordinate is completely
honest, implying that willful manipulation or shirking will not occur. Again, if this
assumption is omitted, control loss will increase. The adequacy of his answer is
defined as IW2Bt?1 (Information provided by Worker 2 (to) Boss). Because his
information can never be more than perfectly appropriate, IW2Bt?1 B 1. He
provides the answers
IW2Btþ1 / min½RIdt  ð1  gtÞ þ rr; 1
Of course, raising RI to a higher power must be justified. When orders are nearly
perfectly appropriate, possible slight gaps are easy to fill in. One of the conclusions
that can be drawn from Bartlett’s (1920, 1932), Alper and Korchin’s (1952, p. 26)
and Tresselt and Spragg’s (1941) experimental work is that the less realism is
experienced by the receiver, the higher the distortion. The relationship between the
appropriateness of orders and their fulfillment is therefore not linear. Choosing a
relationship with a higher exponent than 1—for instance, d (d[ 1)—is one way to
incorporate this insight into our model. The quality of the information is garbled:
It?2 = min [IW2Bt?1 * (1 - gt?1)
d,1]. The superior now gives her operational
instructions based on the information she received. Their adequacy is
OAt?2  (1 - gt) * It?2. Again, the random information garbling factor is
encountered. Assuming It to be irrelevant for the decisions to be taken at t ? 2
(this is another simplification, for the sake of clarity), we can now repeat the cycle.
9 There exist interesting parallels between the determination of these chores within an organization and
what Kornai (1973) describes as ‘‘autonomous control’’ in society as a whole. However, investigating
these parallels would broaden our enquiry too much.
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So, from the above, the simulation model is based on the following six building
blocks:
1. Coefficient 1 - gt is the ‘‘noise effect’’ in the communication RIt and OAt from
superior B to subordinate W and vice versa (IW2Bt). The coefficient
mg(t) represents an upper bound for precision in information transmission.
We assume gt, mg(t) [0,1] and gt = 1 - min([(1.5 - mg) e ? mg,1]), where
e is a random number drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1.
2. IW2Bt?1 is the adequacy of the information to B at time t ? 2, with IB2Wt?1,
[0,1]. A value of 1 means ‘‘perfect information’’ and IB2W1 = 1 is the initial
condition. So, we start with perfect information, initially.
3. W receives OAt = K1 * It, with K1 = 1. OAt might be interpreted as the
‘‘appropriateness’’ of the orders given to W.
4. W takes total actions At?1 ? R = (1 - gt) * AOt ? R.
5. B requests RI(t) information from W. RIt = K2It, with K2 = 1. The information
that B receives at time t ? 1 is IW2Bt?1 = min[(1 - gt)
d RIt ? rr, 1]. d is the
distortion factor, for which in the model we simulated 1.2. Coefficient rr is the
extra information B asks from W.
6. Information available to B at time t ? 2 is It?2 = min[IW2Bt?1(1 - gt), 1].
From here, the next cycle starts.
In non-formal language, the model’s process can be described as follows. In order to
give appropriate instructions to her subordinates, a superior must obtain relevant and
veracious information. A significant part of this information must be obtained from her
subordinates. A superior will therefore regularly instruct her subordinates to provide
her with the information that she regards as pertinent to the decisions she is about to
take. Of course, the relevancy of her request will depend on the quality of information
the superior already has. Her instructions will always be garbled, even if this garbling
is only slight. And the subordinate’s understanding of the requests will never be
perfect, always subject to at least minor distortion. Assuming, however, that there are
no agency complications, the subordinate will give the information he deems relevant.
He may even give some additional information, or adapt the superior’s instructions to
his own ideas of relevancy. Again, during the process of transmittal of the requested
information, some distortion—however tiny—will occur. Alterations can consist of
omission, addition and content change.
At that moment, the superior’s view of reality will undergo some distortion. She
will lack information essential for the decisions to be taken, and part of the
information she believes she has will be erroneous. This distortion will not always
be recognized by the superior, and will therefore not be corrected. The relevancy of
the requests for information from the subordinate will suffer. In earlier stages of our
research, we believed that this was eventually sufficient to cause uncontrollability.
We assumed the quality of the information provided by the worker to his boss was
linear to the quality of her requests. Interestingly, while calculations showed
variations in control, uncontrollability did not appear. In our thinking, this is not
realistic and we therefore looked for improvements of our model that would
increase its realism.
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One of the conclusions that can be drawn from Bartlett’s (1920, 1932)
experimental work is that the less realism is experienced by the receiver, the higher
the distortion. This was corroborated by Tresselt and Spragg (1941). In an
experiment of serial reproduction, the subjects were first ‘‘primed’’ with information
to induce various ‘‘mental sets’’. These mental sets significantly influenced the
amount and the direction of the distortion of the information initially provided.
Alper and Korchin (1952, p. 26) find that ‘‘Much remembering behavior is
motivated by a need to make sense of events past and present, to fit past events into
a contemporary system of meanings.’’ And as we have noted earlier, remembering is
an essential link in the process of reproduction. We incorporated these observations
into our model by changing the linear relationship between the quality of the
information provided by the worker to his boss to the quality of her requests in one
in which the relationship is exponential (with a power of 1.2; see above). This
changed the behavior of the model drastically. In the final version of our model, one
can indeed observe that at a certain point a vicious circle is launched in which the
relevance of the information requested, the veracity and relevance of the answers,
and the congruence between the superior’s knowledge and reality all start to
deteriorate, with this process of deterioration even accelerating over time. The
operational instructions the subordinate receives become less and less accurate and
appropriate, and the fraction of the intentions of a superior effectively satisfied by
the subordinate will become negligible. The organization is now failing.
Our model conservatively reflects the logic implied by the Williamson argument
of information transmission imperfection. The core of the simulation model is a
stochastic logistic equation. We simulated with the model to explore the
consequences of information transmission imperfection in the short and long run.
Here, for the sake of brevity, we only report a random sample of simulation
outcomes (the Matlab program is presented in the Appendix). A graphical
presentation of the result after ten runs is given in Fig. 2, in which each line
represents a run. A run simulates a sequence of 100 decision periods. The outcome
Fig. 2 Dynamics of organizational control loss
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of interest is the extent to which information is garbled, which ultimately determines
the degree of control loss.
In eight runs, control deteriorates suddenly, quickly and permanently, with the
timing of the collapse being completely random. In two runs, control continues to
hover at a high level. In the long run, control will inevitably deteriorate in this pair
of cases as well, though, as was confirmed by extending the simulation run beyond
100 decision periods. We have already seen how Williamson noted that the optimal
n (the number of hierarchical layers) increases as control increases. The opposite is
also true. Optimal n decreases as control decreases. When a falls sufficiently, the
optimal number of hierarchical layers will drop to 1. Optimality is reached by
folding the organization. The organization fails, in the end, and does so inevitably.
Clever procedures, policies and technologies can postpone failure due to control
loss, by bringing a closer to 1, but can never prevent this unhappy ending, as a = 1
is incompatible with the fundamental fact of human information exchange
imperfection.
Evidently, there exist some interesting parallels between the properties of the
model developed here, and those developed earlier in the study of nonlinear
dynamic theory. For instance, Heiner (1989) demonstrates that by partial adjustment
in optimizing behavior a certain level of stability is attained. In our model,
performance is initially also stable at a high level, but a sort of stochastic time bomb
is included in the model that causes control to drop drastically at an unpredictable
moment. Stability is eventually attained again, but at a low level. If Heiner had
included ‘‘a long tail catastrophe’’ in his model (a realistic inclusion, as we argue
here), the parallels would have become more visible.
4 Non-hierarchies
A second limitation of Williamson’s treatment is that his model describes strictly
hierarchically structured organizations. We therefore move our attention to the other
extreme end of the spectrum: worker peer group associations. As will become clear
below, such groups are an interesting theoretical test case for Williamson’s and our
argument, as hierarchical information garbling is absent by definition. Williamson
(1973, p. 321) defined these as groups of people engaged in collective and usually
cooperative activity, providing for some type of income arrangement, but not
entailing subordination. Such a group may arise for associational reasons, because
of risk-bearing advantages and/or to mitigate the effects of indivisibilities (for
instance, in the costs of back-office or of branding activities). They are vulnerable to
free-rider abuses, whether caused by diverging aptitudes or attitudes. In addition, the
economies attributable to indivisibilities can be difficult to achieve in the absence of
any concentration of authority. Traditional professional partnerships are excellent
examples in the real world, as well as ‘‘tolong–menolong’’10 arrangements among
small-scale farmers in many poor communities.
10 This is Malaysian. Verbatim translation: ‘‘to help and be helped’’. For instance, ‘‘you work in my field
today and I work in your field tomorrow’’.
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With individuals not being subordinate to one another (only ‘‘to the group’’),
each individual by definition has considerable leeway in deciding what action to
take. So, the garbling of instructions that we encountered in Williamson’s model is
absent. This does not mean that no communication should take place—quite the
contrary. In order to achieve any benefits, coordination must be achieved, in one
way or the other. For instance, a lawyers’ partnership increases the effectiveness of
its members only when they have an idea of each other’s specific expertise and
current workload. It is only then that they can make use of each other’s slack, and
that they can make use of other partners’ knowledge when a case raises questions
outside one’s own specific field. In relatively small outfits, this knowledge is simple
to acquire. But when the group becomes larger, this can become difficult, not so
much because—at least when a cooperative spirit reigns—questions and answers
are not straightforward, but because one must first find out whom to ask what. After
all, the organization contains N! ‘‘edges’’—a figure that increases sharply with the
size of the organization.
Under these circumstances, the advantages of a communication ‘‘hierarchy’’ are
reasonably obvious (Williamson 1973, p. 322). Whether intentionally or sponta-
neously, a participant is ‘‘appointed’’ who collects and distributes the relevant
information as and when required. Because this activity does not include any
processing of information (she even can be a secretary or a socially active
bookkeeper), her scope can be much larger than that of a supervisor. But in other
ways, the structure closely resembles the hierarchical organizational design
described by Williamson (1967). To emphasize that subordination plays no role,
we arranged the ‘‘informational organization chart’’ of worker peer group in two
semi-circles, as visualized in Fig. 3. It describes a group for which the information
Fig. 3 Communication in a non-hierarchy without a center. Arrows requests for information and
information flows, respectively
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flow runs through two layers, because one information officer can no longer cover
the whole group.
Information flows between the center and the workers initially follow more or
less the same path as that between the manager and the worker described earlier.
However, additionally, the worker regularly will make enquiries at the center, in
order to enable her to make the decisions necessary for her activities. This flow is
described in Fig. 4.
The dynamics of this flow resemble that between a subordinate and a superior.
Again, information is requested, and the request is garbled, however slightly; a
response is made and arrives slightly distorted. The recipient of this information
bases a new enquiry on the slightly garbled information she received earlier. And so
on, and so forth. To avoid a repetition of our earlier analysis, it suffices to state that
the relevance and veracity of this information can, again, be described using a
simulation model. The core of the simulation model is, again, a stochastic logistic
equation. The result will be the same, only in this case the problem is not one of
vertical control loss, but rather of what may be coined horizontal control loss (Nieto
Morales et al. 2013). The worker is her own manager, and therefore always is fully
in control. The problem is that she unknowingly loses touch with the remainder of
the group, and that the remainder of the group unknowingly loses touch with her.
The advantages of cooperation disappear, the reason being that all human
communication, whether vertically or horizontally transmitted, is imperfect, as
was already clear from Bartlett’s (1920, 1932) early work.
We realize that up to now this exercise is only theoretical. Before a peer group
reaches the size where these mechanisms become significant, it is likely to have
been reorganized along much more hierarchical lines, with ‘‘workers’’ becoming
more subordinated to coordination structures involving ‘‘bosses’’. The main reason
is that peer groups become more vulnerable for free-rider problems and decision
processes more inefficient once a peer group has reached a certain size. As we will










Fig. 4 Communication in a non-hierarchy with a center. Top bar information available to worker.
Bottom bar information available at the center. Arrows messages between center and worker. RIt request
for information at time t. IC2Wt information provided by center to worker at time t. IW2Ct information
provided by worker to center at time t
The inevitability and irreversibility of organizational uncontrollability 395
123
5 From simple models to complex realities
In real life, organizations are a heterogeneous network of strictly hierarchical and
lateral authority structures combined with vertical and horizontal (non)authority
lines, and with areas and dimensions in which members of the organization act with
differing degrees of autonomy. In other words, an organization is a heterogeneous
mixture of areas and dimensions that can be characterized as more and less
hierarchically organized. For instance, the ‘‘simple rules’’ approach described by
Eisenhardt and Sull (2001) provides considerable leeway at lower hierarchical
levels. However, as their example of Enron clearly demonstrates, higher manage-
ment (and the regulatory authorities!) must still be able to monitor whether these
rules continue to be appropriate. Because we have just demonstrated that both
extremes—hierarchical and non-hierarchical—are both subject to control loss, the
conclusion is justified that all organizations, whether they are organized as strict
hierarchies or not, will inevitably slip away into uncontrollability at some point in
time. This ultimate state of control loss may sometimes—or perhaps often—be
postponed, but cannot be avoided, in the (literally) end. Hence, Williamson’s
limitation of a hierarchical organization has been relaxed.
For the sake of clarity, we assumed in the hierarchical model that the superior is
completely dependent on hierarchical information flows from below—that is, from
information provided by her subordinate. This is a simplification, as there are often
additional sources of information. Therefore, using multiple sources of information,
and careful checks and cross-checks, may help to postpone the emergence of
uncontrollability by increasing a in our model. For instance, in the ‘‘continental’’
business model (contrary to its Anglo-Saxon counterpart), work councils can, if
given half a chance, provide an invaluable flanking informational structure,
invaluable both for management and for workers (van den Berg et al. 2011). This
was an important motive why, for instance, the Dutch branch of Unilever positively
cultivated its works councils, both at the plant and at the national level.11 The
potential of such a flanking informational structure is further enhanced by
organizational democratization (de Jong and van Witteloostuijn 2004).
In future research, the effect of these and many other uncontrollability-
postponing devices, such as modern information technologies, can be studied in
greater detail. However, introducing such additional sources of information now
would make our model more complex without affecting the pattern of results. To
assume that information cannot be perfect, whatever the quality of the other sources
of information or technologies of exchange that the manager can employ, is very
plausible, and standard in organization sciences, including organizational eco-
nomics. In fact, without an assumption of information imperfection, organizational
economics would be an empty shell. We would then be back in the frictionless
economic paradise of Walrasian general equilibrium perfection. It would then be as
if neither Coase (1937) nor Williamson (1967) would have explained so
11 Personal communication Henri de Bijll Nachenius, a former national industrial relations officer of
Unilever Nederland. See also Brezet and de Bijll Nachenius (1998, p. 132).
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convincingly and lucidly that assuming such a perfect world implies assuming away
organizations to start with.
To illustrate that the phenomenon of ‘‘uncontrollability’’ is not just a figment of
our theoretical modeling or our academic imagination, we would like to briefly
discuss a few real-life examples that, of course, cannot prove anything, but that
nicely bring our argument to life. First, a short citation from recent history may be
instrumental. Lewis (2010, p. 174) cites Steve Eisman ‘‘I’d go into meetings with
Wall Street CEOs and ask them the most basic questions about their balance sheets.
They didn’t know. They didn’t know their own balance sheets.’’ And on page 254,
he cites John Gutfreund, former CEO of Salomon Brothers, as saying ‘‘I didn’t
understand all the product lines and they don’t either.’’ We all know how this ended.
Lehman Brothers went into bankruptcy, its remains inserted into a few surviving
financial institutions in the US and elsewhere, and Salomon Brothers disappeared
into the black hole of the Citigroup.
Uncontrollability does not mean that control is zero, and it does not automatically
imply that the effectiveness of the organization will disappear completely. In the
case of control being 100 %, all the intentions of the boss are effectively and fully
satisfied by the worker. In other words, the actions of the worker are bounded by the
intentions of the principal. In case of uncontrollability, the actions of the worker are
bounded by the inappropriate instructions given and by the monitoring, reward and
penalty options still feasible and operational. Within these much wider bounds,
personnel will follow their own private inclinations. Rational but loyal workers,
knowing that information available to management is garbled, will act ‘in the spirit
of the orders’ they receive—i.e., show ‘intelligent’ effort. However, because their
understanding of the complete picture is deficient, this effort to adapt instructions
can easily lead them in the wrong direction. This can often be observed in the trade-
off between quality and quantity, when workers believe that the interests of the firm
are best served by increasing quantity (knowing that quality will suffer), while
management realizes that lack of quality is causing a loss of customers.
Inappropriate motivation, unknown to management, can also be a problem. Many
workers have selected their job because they like what they end up doing. A bus
driver likes to drive his bus, albeit preferably in his own time and according to his
own schedule. An uncontrollable public bus company will therefore still see its
buses driving around. But the bosses do not know why buses are late, why so many
buses remain idle in the workshop, why passengers are treated atrociously by some
drivers (nasty characters) or courteously by other drivers (nice chaps who love to
interact with people), why some bus-stops are ignored, and why productivity is so
unacceptably low and costs are so excessively high. This is similar to another
systematic and classic analysis of a certain type of uncontrollable organisations, or
‘‘organized anarchies’’: Cohen et al.’s (1972) classic garbage can model.
Often control is different, in degree and in the way executed, in different
dimensions. An organization’s productive activities can be completely out of
control, while its cash management is still in order, and it can still comply with a
rigorously hard budget constraint. If output is not considered to be essential, the
budget will be kept in place and output will be allowed to sink. Anybody can
provide many examples. Just to illustrate the point, the following case is revealing.
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In the 1980s, one of this article’s authors encountered a soil survey project of the
United Nations in Sierra Leone. The project had been planned on the basis of the
UNDP providing (expensive) expatriate personnel, while the local government was
to provide transport. The local government did not meet its commitments and no
transport was available. After a few months of deskwork, all work was forced to
stop; but after 2 or 3 years, the experts were still there. No work of any value could
be done (except helping this author to a number of maps he needed for his own
work). It is a mystery what hierarchical level in the UN was informed of this waste
of money, but someone decided not to inform his superior. In any case, the
information was lost and no action was taken to stop this ‘‘counter-intentional
expenditure’’. However, planning and budget were probably completely in order.
The author (a former employee of UNDP himself) often observed how strictly and
controlled expenditure was managed. At the top, nobody knew that output was
absent. Expenditure continued until the money was spent. As a post-script,
therefore, a slight differentiation should be added. Control can have various
dimensions. An organization may experience uncontrollability in one dimension,
whilst still being completely in control in another.
As a second illustration we could mention British Petroleum (BP) in the 2000s.
There is every indication that financial control of the oil company was in order
(accountants made no reservations in approving the annual report). Management
knew how much money was being spent on what and how much profit was made
where and with what products. At the same time, BP management lacked
knowledge on the safety of its operations. Disasters were waiting to happen, and
eventually two disasters did happen: Texas oil refinery and Deepwater Horizon.
Even if it was narrowly pursuing profits and no environmental or humane
considerations had entered into its equations, had BP management been in control it
would have eliminated these risks. BP narrowly escaped bankruptcy. BP was lucky,
but many other organizations were not, as we could illustrate with reference to
banks in the time leading to the 2008 financial crisis.
6 Conclusion
Organizational failure is by no means an understudied phenomenon. Quite a number
of internal and external causes have been identified, and studied in great detail. By
analyzing the dynamics of the concept of ‘‘control’’, an additional internal cause of
failure is introduced with far-reaching consequences. We believe that we have
identified a specific source of organizational control loss that—once a certain level is
reached—cannot be repaired, curbed or predicted, and therefore cannot avoided. We
introduce the term uncontrollability to describe this condition, defined as the
situation in which control has fallen below a certain level such that the principal
cannot take any effective remedial action because, for lack of sufficiently accurate
and relevant information, adequate diagnosis is not possible, implying that ultimately
each and every organization is bound to fail, falling victim of irreversible
uncontrollability. The words ‘‘ultimately bound to’’ and ‘‘irreversible’’ can be
translated into a more formal language as lim
t!1Ptðat\minÞ ¼ 1 in which ‘‘min’’ is
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the minimum level of control below which the organization has become uncontrol-
lable. Because ‘‘in the long run we are all dead’’, as Keynes (in)famously stated in
1923, this claim is immune against direct falsification. However, many links in the
chain of the argument are susceptible and a number of them have already undergone
empirical testing (see van der Mandele 2006, pp. 95–112). We show that this
vulnerability to uncontrollability persists, even in a completely stable environment.
A metaphor that illustrates this key logic is the shattered windshield of a car.
Even the great Michael Schumacher, the world champion Formula I racing for many
years, would not be able to keep his car on the road when his car’s windshield would
be shattered. Similarly, organizational uncontrollability is inevitable in the long run.
Even though chances of the occurrence of uncontrollability can be minimized (for
instance, by avoiding driving on newly graveled asphalt roads, in the Schumacher
example), it is inevitable and irreversible. When exactly organizational uncontrol-
lability will arise cannot be predicted, in the same way as it cannot be predicted
when a windshield will shatter. However, if our model mirrors reality (and we have
no reason to assume it does not), we can argue that it will happen, inevitably. It can
be postponed, but not avoided—thus follows our conjecture that uncontrollability is
haphazard, inevitable and irreparable. In future work, after further developing our
model, more detailed and systematic computer simulations can be run to explore the
effect of different uncontrollability-postponing managerial interventions.
We derive this result without imposing any of the assumptions so typical for
organizational economics. That is, in our model, we have not introduced the assumption
that agents are guided by self-interest. Conflict of interest is absent, and agents behave
honestly in the interest of their principals. In our ‘‘Bartlettian’’ world of imperfect
communication, we only have willing, hard-working and altruistic people, all trying to do
their utmost best to serve the interests of their boss and organization. Introducing
additional elements of imperfection in the model, from free riding and shirking to
corrupted and self-serving behavior, would further aggravate the diseconomies that
ultimately trigger failure. Seen like this, our narrative is complementary to the established
stories about organizational decline and failure that can be found in the literature.
The essence of imperfect human information exchange for the theory of the firm
was largely missed by later organization theory, particularly organizational
economics. For instance, Calvo and Wellisz (1978) and Qian (1994) equate a high
level of control with a high level of effort, which is standard in agency theory-
inspired organizational economics. In formal vocabulary, we could say that it is not
the length of the vector, as much as the length of its perpendicular projection onto
the principal’s utility vector. In other words, control is not only a question of the
effectiveness of the whip, but also of appropriate and effective use of the reins. In
their use of the term ‘‘control’’, Maskin et al. (2000), e.g., also miss an essential
dimension of Williamson’s (1967) use of the term, believing that control is achieved
when units are monitored through ‘‘yardstick competition’’. However, Williamson’s
control involves monitoring the appropriateness of the yardsticks as well.
Our logic squarely follows Coase’s (1937), Simon’s (1951) and Williamson’s
(1967) classic contributions to the theory of the firm. However, their and our emphasis
on authority deviates from mainstream organizational economics. As Hart and Moore
(2005, p. 679) point out, by and large, existing literature does not analyze hierarchy in
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terms of authority. Papers by Aghion and Tirole (1995), Baker et al. (1999) and Rajan
and Zingales (2001) are exceptions. We believe that this emphasis on authority is
essential in the study of organizational decline and failure, as is clear from the huge
leadership literature (e.g., Judge et al. 2002; van Vught et al. 2008), particularly to the
extent that leadership is linked to group or organizational performance (see Boone
et al. 2005). The reason for this is that, by doing so, the imperfect nature of human
communication can be brought back into the heart of the theory of the firm.12
Our control loss argument is complementary to other antecedents of organiza-
tional malfunctioning as identified in organization theory. For instance, we assume
that the boss is bright, that the worker is honest, and that both are in a happy state of
goal congruence. Assuming the boss is not that bright (which would significantly
increase the realism of the model) merely aggravates control loss, as would the
assumption that the subordinate is not completely honest, loyal and obedient,
engaging willful manipulation or shirking (ditto). In our model, nowhere does a lack
of cognitive abilities, neither on the side of the superior, nor on that of the
subordinate, enter into the equation. In the same vein, we assume that there is full
goal congruence between superior and subordinate. As such, our analysis diverges
from classical agency theory. In so doing, we focus on the effect of imperfect
information exchange. Any extra impact from other types of imperfection can easily
be introduced, which would only aggrevate the inevitability of uncontrollability.
Our argument suggests that an information exchange imperfection perspective
can and should enrich the theory of the firm (cf. Galbraith 1977). If we accept the
fundamental fact that human information exchange can never be fully accurate,
whatever clever monitoring devices are installed and whatever sophisticated
information technologies are implemented, due to the intrinsic and unavoidable
imperfect working of the human brain, then any theory of the firm is incomplete if
the implications of this imperfection are not taken on board. In this paper, we
offered a first exploration of possible implications, starting from Williamson’s
(1967) very insightful control theory of organizational size. Further work is needed
to fully develop this information exchange imperfection perspective—e.g., to
examine what managers and organizations can do to postpone the inevitable
downsides of uncontrollability. For instance, in the literature regarding strategic
delegation (see, e.g., Vickers 1985; Jansen et al. 2007), the implicit assumption is
that the agent is fully aware of the intentions of the principal, implying an untenable
assumption of perfect human information exchange. Relaxing this assumption is
likely to reduce the acclaimed advantages of strategic delegation practices.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and
the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
12 However, even if authority is played down, control still remains relevant. For instance, Tannenbaum
(1962, p. 237) defines a social organization as ‘‘an ordered arrangement of individual interactions. Control
processes help circumscribe idiosyncratic behaviors and keep them conformant with the rational plan of
the organization.’’ Or Leifer and Mills (1996, p. 114), citing Etzioni (1961): ‘‘assuring that behaviors are
oriented to organizational objectives is the central notion of organizational control.’’
400 H. Mandele, A. Witteloostuijn
123
Appendix
Matlab program simulating uncontrollability 
tic 
Matriz(1:1,1)=[0.003:0.003:.003]'; %rr values  !!!!numbers should equal values to be tested!!!!! 
mg=0.98; 0.9 Upper bound for precision. Beyond it there is noise. Try 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 0.9 
K1 = 1; 
K2 = 1; 
R = 0; 
d = 1-2 
Time = 100; 
z = 1.1; 
TrialsPerCase = 100;  
NumberOfRuns = 10;  
for i=1:1:NumberOfRuns  
    AAverage = zeros(Time,1); 
    IW2BAverage = zeros(Time,1); 
    IB2WAverage = zeros(Time,1); 
for trials=1:1:TrialsPerCase 
    clear A IB2W IW2B OA RI g rr 
    rr = Matriz(1,1);  
    for t=1:1:Time 
        g(t) = 1-min([rand(1,1)*(z-mg)+mg,1]); 
        if t~= 1  
            if mod(t,2)==0 %odd number 
               IW2B(t) = min((1-g(t-1))*RI(t-1)^d + rr,1); 
               IB2W(t) = IB2W(t-1); 
            else  
               %even number 
               IW2B(t) = IW2B(t-1); 
               IB2W(t)= min(IW2B(t-1)*(1-g(t-1)),1); 
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            end 
        else 
            IB2W(1)=1; 
            IW2B(1)=1; 
        end 
        OA(t)= K1*IB2W(t); 
        if t>=2 
           A(t)= min((1-g(t-1))*OA(t-1) + R,1); 
        else 
           A(t)=1; 
        end 
        if t>=2  
           RI(t)= K2*IW2B(t-1); 
        else 
           RI(t)=1; 
        end 
    end 
AAverage=AAverage + A'; 
IW2BAverage = IW2BAverage + IW2B'; 
IB2WAverage = IB2WAverage + IB2W'; 




Output = [AAverage IW2BAverage IB2WAverage]; 
nombre=['Output' int2str(mg*100) '_' int2str(i) '.dat']; 
save(nombre, 'Output' ,'-ascii','-tabs'); 
%subplot(1,3,1) 













end %end for i 
toc 
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